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ABSTRACT
I construct a neoclassical, Q-theoretical foundation for time-varying expected returns in connection
with corporate policies and events. Under certain conditions, stock return equals investment return,
which is directly tied with firm characteristics. This single equation is shown analytically to be
qualitatively consistent with many anomalies, including the relations of future stock returns with
market-to-book, investment and disinvestment rates, seasoned equity offerings, tender offers and
stock repurchases, dividend omissions and initiations, expected profitability, profitability, and more








A large body of empirical literature in nancial economics has documented relations of future
stock returns with characteristics and corporate events, relations that are called anomalies
because they are hard to explain using current asset pricing models (e.g., Fama (1998) and
Schwert (2003)). Many believe that these anomalies are strong evidence against ecient
markets and rational expectations (e.g., Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003)).
I construct a neoclassical, Q-theoretical foundation for time-varying expected returns in
connection with corporate policies. If the operating-prot and the adjustment-cost functions
have the same degree of homogeneity, stock return equals investment return, which is directly
tied with characteristics and corporate policies via the rst principles of optimal investment.
By signing the partial derivatives of investment returns, I demonstrate analytically that
the Q-theory is potentially consistent with many anomalies often interpreted as over- and
underreaction in inecient markets (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hir-
shleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999)). These anomalies include:
1. The investment-disinvestment anomaly: The investment-to-asset ratio is negatively
correlated, but the disinvestment-to-asset ratio is positively correlated with future
returns. This anomaly is stronger in rms with high operating income-to-capital.
2. The value anomaly: Average returns correlate negatively with market-to-book, and
the magnitude of this correlation decreases with the market value.
3. The payout anomaly: When rms tender their stocks or announce share repurchases or
dividend initiations, they earn positive long-term abnormal returns, and the magnitude
of the abnormal returns is stronger in value rms than in growth rms.
24. The seasoned-equity-oering (SEO) anomaly: Firms conducting SEOs earn lower
average returns in the next three to ve years than nonissuing rms, and the magnitude
of this underperformance is stronger in small rms than in big rms.
5. The expected-protability anomaly: Expected protability correlates positively with
expected returns, and this correlation decreases with the market value.
6. The protability anomaly: Given market-to-cash ows or market-to-book, more
protable rms earn higher average returns. This relation is stronger in small rms.
7. The post-earnings-announcement drift (earnings momentum): Firms with high
earnings surprise earn higher average returns than rms with low earnings surprise,
and this anomaly is stronger in small rms.
In a nutshell, I demonstrate that, much like aggregate expected returns that vary
over business cycles (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), expected returns in the cross
section vary with rm characteristics, corporate policies, and events. This is achieved in a
neoclassical model with rational expectations in the spirit of Kydland and Prescott (1982).
Intuitively, investment return from time t to t+1 equals the ratio of the marginal prot
of investment at t+1 divided by the marginal cost of investment at t. This equation suggests
two economic mechanisms that are potential driving forces of these anomalies.
The rst four anomalies can be explained by optimal investment. The Q-theory is a theory
of investment demand | the downward-sloping investment-demand function derived from
the rst principles of optimal investment implies a negative relation between cost of capital
(i.e., expected return) and investment demand. Basically, investment-to-asset increases with
net present value of capital (e.g., Brealey and Myers (2003, Chapter 2)), and the net present
3value decreases with cost of capital. Controlling for expected future cash ows, high cost of
capital implies low net present value, which in turn implies low investment demand. Low
cost of capital implies high net present value, which in turn implies high investment demand.
Figure 1 plots the downward-sloping investment-demand function. The negative slope of
this function suggests that expected return decreases with positive investment but increases
with the magnitude of disinvestment, i.e., the investment-disinvestment anomaly. The gure
also shows the distribution of rms with related characteristics other than investment-to-
asset, It
Kt, across the investment-demand curve. Similar to high investment-to-asset rms,
growth rms, issuing rms, and low payout rms are distributed on the right end of the curve
associated with low expected returns, whereas similar to low investment-to-asset rms, value
rms, nonissuing rms, and high payout rms are distributed on the left end of the curve
associated with high expected returns.






















4Intuitively, investment rate is an increasing function of marginal q, i.e., the present value
of future marginal prots of capital, which is in turn proportional to market-to-book. The
negative slope of the investment-demand function then implies a negative relation between
expected return and market-to-book. The payout anomaly follows because rms' cash-ow
constraint (that equates the sources with the uses of funds) implies a negative relation
between the payout and investment rates. And the SEO anomaly follows because the cash-
ow constraint implies a positive relation between the equity-nancing and investment rates.
With decreasing returns to scale or strictly convex adjustment costs, the relation between
expected return and market-to-book is convex | in the example of quadratic adjustment
costs, the investment-demand function is also convex. This convexity manifests itself, by the
chain rule of partial derivatives, as the stronger value anomaly in small rms, the stronger
SEO anomaly in small rms, and the stronger payout anomaly in value rms.
In contrast, the three earnings-related anomalies can be explained by the marginal
product of capital (MPK) at time t+1 in the numerator of investment return through the
MPK-mechanism. Specically, MPK is proportional to protability, a property that implies a
positive relation between expected protability and expected return. This positive relation in
turn explains the protability anomaly because protability is a strong, positive predictor of
future protability. And because earnings surprise and protability are both scaled earnings,
they should contain similar information on future protability. If so, earnings surprise should
correlate positively with expected returns, as in the post-earnings-announcement drift.
Intriguingly, the Q-explanation of anomalies does not involve risk, at least directly, even
though the model is entirely rational. The reason is that I derive expected returns from
rms' optimality conditions, instead of consumers'. As a result, the stochastic discount fac-
5tor (SDF) and its covariances with returns do not directly enter the expected-return determi-
nation. Characteristics are sucient statistics for expected returns! Therefore, the debate
on covariances versus characteristics in ecient markets in empirical nance (e.g., Daniel
and Titman (1997) and Davis, Fama, and French (2000)) is not a well-dened question.
I also propose the Q-representation of expected returns as a new empirical asset pricing
model. Although internally consistent with the beta- and the SDF-framework in theory, the
Q-representation is likely to have practical advantages over these two standard models. The
reason is that estimated costs of equity from beta-pricing models are extremely imprecise
even at the industry level (e.g., Fama and French (1997)). But the Q-representation avoids
the dicult tasks of estimating covariances and of identifying the right form of the SDF.
The insight that stock and investment returns are equal rst appears in Cochrane
(1991). Cochrane (1991, 1996) is also among the rst to study asset prices from rms'
perspective. Restoy and Rockinger (1994) formally establish this equivalence under linear
homogeneity. An early version of Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2004) extends the result
under debt nancing. I extend the result under homogeneity of the same degree for the
operating-prot and adjustment-cost functions. I dier further from these papers that focus
on aggregate investment returns, because I aim to understand anomalies in the cross section.
The Q-theory is originated by Tobin (1969). Hayashi (1982) establishes the equivalence
between marginal q and average Q under linear homogeneity. Abel and Eberly (1994) extend
this result into a stochastic setting with partial irreversibility and xed costs proportional to
capital. They also show that marginal q is proportional to average Q when the operating-
prots and the adjustment-cost functions are homogeneous of the same degree, a result I use
extensively. The Q-theory has been used mostly to explain the behavior of investment. But
6I oer the prospects of its large-scale applications to the cross section of returns.
My work shares its long-term goal with the growing literature, pioneered by Berk, Green,
and Naik (1999), the literature that aims to understand the real determinants of the cross
section of returns.1 I contribute by expanding the scope of explained anomalies and by
unifying many anomalies under a single, analytical framework. I also propose a new empirical
asset pricing model with which many ideas of this highly theoretical literature can be tested.
Comparisons with specic papers are presented throughout Section 3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and establishes
the equivalence between stock and investment returns. Section 3 uses this equivalence to
explain anomalies, Section 4 discusses empirical implications of my theoretical results, and
Section 5 concludes. Appendix A briey reviews the anomalous evidence that motivates this
paper, and Appendix B contains all the proofs not in the main text.
2 The Model of the Firm
This section presents the basic elements of the Q-theory. My exposition is heavily inuenced
by Abel and Eberly (1994) and an early version of Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2004). Section
2.1 describes the basic environment. Section 2.2 characterizes the behavior of rm value-
maximization, and establishes the equivalence between stock and investment returns.
2.1 The Environment
Consider a rm that uses capital and a vector of costlessly adjustable inputs, such as labor,
to produce a perishable output. The rm chooses the levels of these inputs each period to
1Other important examples include Berk (1995), Johnson (2002), Berk, Green, and Naik (2004), Carlson,
Fisher, and Giammarino (2004a, 2004b), Chen (2004), Cooper (2004), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003),
Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2004), Gourio (2004), Kogan (2004), Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004), Pastor
and Veronesi (2004), Whited and Wu (2004), and Zhang (2005).
7maximize its operating prot, dened as its revenue minus the expenditures on these inputs.
Taking the operating prot as given, the rm then chooses optimal investment to maximize
its market value. Capital investment involves costs of adjustment.
2.1.1 The Operating-Prot Function
Let t=(Kt;Xt) denote the maximized operating prot at time t, where Kt is the capital
stock at time t and Xt is a vector of random variables representing exogenous shocks to
the operating prot, such as aggregate and rm-specic shocks to production technology,
shocks to the prices of costlessly adjusted inputs, or industry- and rm-specic shocks to the
demand of the output produced by the rm.
Assumption 1 The operating prot function is homogeneous of degree  with 1:
(Kt;Xt) = (Xt)K

t where (Xt) > 0 (1)
If =1, the operating-prot function displays linear homogeneity in Kt. This applies to a
competitive rm that is a price-taker in output and factor markets.2 When <1, the rm
has market power (e.g., Cooper and Ejarque (2001)).
From Assumption 1,
(Kt;Xt) = 1(Kt;Xt)Kt (2)
2This can be seen from the static maximization problem of the rm that chooses the vector of costlessly
adjustable inputs. Let Lt denote this vector and F(Kt;Lt;Xt) denote the revenue function that is linearly








where Wt is the vector of market prices of the costlessly adjustable inputs, the second equality follows
from the linear homogeneity of F(K;L;X) in K and L, and the third equality follows by dening
(Xt)  maxLt=Kt f[F(1;Lt=Kt;Xt)   W0
t(Lt=Kt)]g. The rst-order condition with respect to Lt says
that F2(Kt;Lt;Xt) = Wt. The linear homogeneity of F(Kt;Lt;Xt) in Kt and Lt then implies that
F(1;Lt=Kt;Xt) W0
t(Lt=Kt)=F1(1;Lt=Kt;Xt) which is clearly positive. Therefore, 1(Kt;Xt)=(Xt)>0.
If F3(Kt;Lt;Xt) is positive, then 0(Xt)>0.
8Marginal product of capital is strictly positive, 1(Kt;Xt)>0, where subscript i denotes the
rst-order partial derivative with respect to the ith argument. Multiple subscripts denote
high-order partial derivatives. 1(Kt;Xt) decreases with capital, reecting decreasing return
to scale, 11(Kt;Xt)0, where the inequality is strict when <1. Finally, 111(Kt;Xt)0.
More important, equation (2) implies that marginal product of capital, 1, is also
proportional to the average product of capital,
(Kt;Xt)
Kt . This ratio corresponds roughly
to accounting protability (earnings-to-book) plus depreciation rate. The operating prot
in the model corresponds approximately to earnings plus capital depreciation in the data.
This assumes that accruals are only used to mitigate the accounting timing and matching
problems that deviate operating cash ow from earnings in practice (e.g., Dechow (1994)).
These accounting problems are abstracted from the model.
2.1.2 The Augmented Adjustment-Cost Function
Capital accumulates according to:
Kt+1 = It + (1   )Kt (3)
Thus end-of-period capital equals real investment plus beginning-of-period capital net of
depreciation. Capital depreciates at a xed proportional rate of .
When the rm invests, it incurs costs because of: (i) purchase/sale costs, (ii) convex costs
of physical adjustment, and (iii) weakly convex costs of raising capital when the sum of the
purchase/sale and physical adjustment costs is higher than the operating prot.
(i) Purchase/sales costs are incurred when the rm buys or sells uninstalled capital.
When the rm disinvests, this cost is negative. For analytical convenience, I assume that the
relative purchase price and relative sale price of capital are both equal to unity. This diers
9from Abel and Eberly (1994), who assume that purchase price is higher than sale price to
capture costly reversibility because of, for example, rm-specicity of capital and adverse
selection in the market for used capital. In this case, the purchase/sale cost function is not
dierentiable at It=0. My assumption retains this dierentiability. Costly reversibility can
still be captured by letting the convex costs of disinvestment be uniformly higher than those
of investment with equal magnitudes (e.g., Hall (2001) and Zhang (2004)).
(ii) Convex costs of physical adjustment are nonnegative costs that are zero when
It = 0. These costs are continuous, strictly convex in It, non-increasing in capital Kt, and
dierentiable with respect to It and Kt everywhere. The second-order partial derivative of
the convex-cost function with respect to Kt is nonnegative. It is straightforward to verify
that the standard quadratic, convex adjustment-cost function satises all these assumptions.
(iii) Costs of raising capital are incurred when the nancial decit, denoted Ot, is strictly
positive. I dene Ot as the higher value between zero and the sum of the purchase/sale costs
and convex costs of adjustment minus the operating prot. I assume that the nancing-cost
function is continuous, weakly convex in Ot (and hence in It) and decreasing in Kt. Its rst-
order partial derivative with respect to Ot (and hence with respect to It) is zero when Ot=0.
The nancing-cost function is dierentiable with respect to Ot (and hence with respect to
It) and Kt everywhere. And the second-order partial derivative of the function with respect
to Kt is nonnegative. Previous studies of nancing costs (e.g., Gomes (2001) and Hennessy
and Whited (2004)) assume that the costs are proportional to the amount of funds raised.






Kt with b>0. Both the proportional and the
quadratic nancing-cost functions satisfy the aforementioned assumptions.
The ip side of nancial decit is free cash ow, denoted Ct. I dene Ct as the higher
10value between zero and the operating prot minus the sum of the purchase/sale costs and
the convex costs of adjustment. I assume that whenever Ct is strictly positive, the rm pays
it back to its shareholders either in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. The model
is silent on the behavior of cash hoarding or on the form of payout. Further, I assume that
the rm does not pay any extra costs when paying cash out of the rm. Therefore, the rm
either raises capital or distributes payout, but never at the same time.
The total cost of investment represents the sum of purchase/sale costs, convex costs of
physical adjustment, and costs of raising capital. I denote the total cost as (It;Kt), and
refer to it as the augmented adjustment-cost function. To summarize,
Assumption 2 The augmented adjustment-cost function (It;Kt) satises:
2(It;Kt)  0; 22(It;Kt)  0; and 11(It;Kt) > 0;
The most important technical assumption is stated explicitly below:
Assumption 3 The augmented adjustment-cost function is homogeneous of the same









Coupled with Assumption 2, Assumption 3 implies that G00()>0 and that
(It;Kt) = 1(It;Kt)It + 2(It;Kt)Kt (5)
Assumption 3 is necessary in establishing the equivalence between stock and investment
returns (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix B). But how restrictive is Assumption
3? Abel and Eberly (1994) discuss its content for the case of linear homogeneity. I follow
11their exposition except for the nancing-cost function. The linear homogeneity of (It;Kt)
means that each of its three components is linearly homogenous. (i) A doubling of It doubles
the purchase/sale costs that are linear in It, and are independent of Kt. (ii) The investment
literature typically assumes that physical adjustment costs are linearly homogenous (e.g.,
Hayashi (1982), Abel and Blanchard (1983), and Abel and Eberly (1994)). And (iii) the
proportional and quadratic nancing-cost functions are linearly homogeneous in It and Kt.
Relative to the specication in Abel and Eberly (1994), my augmented adjustment-cost
function adds the convex costs of nancing, but ignores the wedge between purchase and
sale prices of capital and xed costs of adjustment. The xed costs of raising capital are not
included either. Incorporating these features will compromise the dierentiability of (It;Kt)
with respect to It at the two points where It=0 and Ot=0. The theory below works almost
everywhere but at these two points where investment return is ill-dened because 1 does
not exist (see equation (15) below). Although not implemented here, it is possible to dene
two dierent investment returns at these two points using the left- and the right-side partial
derivatives of  with respect to It.
More important, including the wedge between the purchase and sale prices of capital and
xed costs of investment and raising capital leaves the crucial Assumption 3 unaltered. As
argued in Abel and Eberly (1994), the purchase/sale costs are proportional to It. And the
xed costs are linearly homogenous in Kt, if they reect the costs of interrupting production,
and are therefore proportional to the operating prot and to capital.
Finally, it is ultimately an empirical question how restrictive Assumption 3 is. But I note
that the special case of =1 is standard in the empirical investment literature (e.g., Hubbard
(1998) and Erickson and Whited (2000)). Further, several numerically solved models such
12as Cooper (2005), Kogan (2004), and Zhang (2005) yield qualitatively similar results as my
analytical results. In particular, Zhang's model structure is very similar to mine, and the
only relevant dierence is that in his model the operating-prot and the adjustment-cost
functions have dierent degrees of homogeneity.
2.2 Dynamic Value Maximization
I now characterize rm's value-maximization behavior. The dynamic problem is:







Mt;t+j ((Kt+j;Xt+j)   (It+j;Kt+j))
#
(6)
where V (Kt;Xt) is the cum-dividend market value | when j = 0, (Kt;Xt) (It;Kt) is
included in V (Kt;Xt). Mt;t+j>0 is the stochastic discount factor from time t to t+j. Mt;t=1
and Mt;t+iMt+i+1;t+j =Mt;t+j for some integer i between 0 and j. For notational simplicity,
I use Mt+j to denote Mt;t+j whenever the starting date is t.
2.2.1 Marginal q, Tobin's Average Q, and Market-to-Book
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the value function is also homogenous of degree :
V (Kt;Xt) = V1(Kt;Xt)Kt
Dene Tobin's average Q as b Qt
V (Kt;Xt)
Kt , then V1(Kt;Xt)=b Qt.
Let qt be the present-value multiplier associated with capital accumulation equation (3).








Mt+j ((Kt+j;Xt+j)   (It+j;Kt+j)   qt+j[Kt+j+1   (1   )Kt+j   It+j])
#
(7)
13The rst-order conditions with respect to It and Kt+1 are, respectively,
qt = 1(It;Kt) (8)
qt = Et[Mt+1[1(Kt+1;Xt+1)   2(It+1;Kt+1) + (1   )qt+1]] (9)
Solving equation (9) recursively yields an economic interpretation for marginal q:









Proposition 1 (The Link between Marginal q and Market-to-Book) Dene the
ex-dividend rm value, Pt, as:
Pt  P(Kt;Kt+1;Xt) = V (Kt;Xt)   (Kt;Xt) + (It;Kt) (11)
And dene the market-to-book equity as Qt Pt
Kt+1 then under Assumptions 1 and 3,
qt = Qt (12)
In the continuous time formulation of the Q-theory (e.g., Hayashi (1982) and Abel and
Eberly (1994)), marginal qt is proportional to Tobin's average Qt, i.e., qt =  b Qt. But in
discrete time, V1(Kt;Xt) is not exactly marginal qt. The time-to-build convention reected
in the capital accumulation equation (3) implies that one unit of investment today only
becomes eective next period. As a result, qt and b Qt are linked through:
qt = Et[Mt+1 b Qt+1] (13)
14To see this, note the derivative of equation (7) with respect to Kt is V1(Kt;Xt)=1(Kt;Xt) 
2(It;Kt) + qt(1   ). Equation (13) then follows from Lemma 1 and equation (9).
Several useful properties of (It;Kt) evaluated at the optimum can be established using
equation (8) and the link between marginal q and average b Qt.
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the augmented adjustment-cost function (It;Kt),
when evaluated at the optimum, satises:
1(It;Kt) > 0; 12(It;Kt)  0; and 122(It;Kt)  0
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof of the last two inequalities. The rst inequality can
be shown as follows. From Assumptions 1 and 2, 1 > 0 and 2  0, equation (10) then
implies that qt>0. But from equation (8), 1 equals qt at the optimum. Therefore, although
1 in general can be positive, negative, or zero when It  0, it is strictly positive at the
optimum. Equivalently, G0() is strictly positive at the optimum.
2.2.2 Investment and Stock Returns
Combining the rst-order conditions in equations (8) and (9) yields:
Et[Mt+1r
I
t+1] = 1 (14)
where rI




1(Kt+1;Xt+1)   2(It+1;Kt+1) + (1   )1(It+1;Kt+1)
1(It;Kt)
(15)
The investment-return equation (15) is very intuitive | rI
t+1 can be interpreted as the
ratio of the marginal benet of investment at time t+1 divided by the marginal cost of
15investment at time t. The denominator, 1(It;Kt), is the marginal cost of investment.
By optimality, it equals the marginal qt, the expected present value of marginal prots
of investment. In the numerator of equation (15), 1(Kt+1;Xt+1) is the extra operating
prot from the extra capital at t+1;  2(It+1;Kt+1) captures the eect of extra capital on
the augmented adjustment cost; and (1   )1(It+1;Kt+1) is the expected present value of
marginal prots evaluated at time t+1, net of depreciation.















Given this equivalence, I will use the common notation rt+1 to denote both returns.
3 Understanding Anomalies
The equivalence between stock and investment returns is an extremely powerful result.
It provides a theoretically motivated, analytical link between expected returns and rm
characteristics, a link that can serve as an economic foundation for understanding anomalies.
Developing this foundation is the heart of this paper. I rst discuss in Section 3.1 the
methodology of the Q-determination of expected returns, and its relation to the standard
risk-based determination. Section 3.2 xes the basic intuition using two canonical examples.
And Section 3.3 extends the intuition into the more general Q-theoretical framework.
163.1 Methodology
My analytical methods are very simple. They basically amount to taking and signing partial
derivatives of the expected investment return in equation (15) with respect to various
anomaly-related variables. Using partial derivatives is reasonable because to establish a
new anomaly, empiricists often control for other known anomalies, a practice corresponding
naturally to partial derivatives.3 Cochrane (1991, 1996) uses similar techniques to explain the
return-investment relations. Similar methods are commonly used in the empirical literature
to develop testable hypotheses from valuation models (e.g., Fama and French (2004)).
As a more fundamental departure from the traditional asset pricing approach, which
derives expected returns from consumers' rst-order conditions and determines expected
returns through risk, I follow Cochrane (1991) and derive expected returns from rms' rst-
order conditions. As a result, expected returns are directly tied with rm characteristics.4
Intriguingly, the stochastic discount factor, Mt+1, and its covariances with returns (i.e.,
risk) do not enter the expected-return determination. And rm characteristics are sucient
statistics for expected returns. I thus need not specify Mt+1 | production-based asset
pricing can in principle be developed independently from consumption-based asset pricing,
without being hindered by diculties specic to the latter literature.
However, this practice only means that the eect of Mt+1 is indirect, not irrelevant.
For example, if Mt+1 were a constant, M, then equation (14) implies that the expected
return Et[rt+1]= 1
M, a constant uncorrelated with rm characteristics. And if the correlation
3For example, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Haugen and Baker (1996) control for valuation
ratios when they document the earnings momentum and protability anomalies, respectively.
4Rubinstein (2001, p. 23) highlights the importance of analyzing corporate decisions in solving anomalies:
\For the most part, nancial economists take the stochastic process of stock prices, the value of the rms, or
dividend payments as primitive. But to explain some anomalies, we may need to look deeper into the guts
of corporate decision making to derive what the processes are."
17between Mt+1 and Xt+1 is zero, i.e., rms' operating prots are unaected by aggregate
shocks, then equation (14) implies that Et[rt+1]=rft, where rft 1
Et[Mt+1] is risk-free rate. In
this case, there is no cross-sectional variation in expected returns. The analysis below in eect
provides time-series correlations between the risk-free rate and rm characteristics. Since I
study expected returns directly, as opposed to expected excess returns, I need not restrict the
correlation between Mt+1 and Xt+1, the correlation that determines expected excess returns.
The characteristic-based approach is consistent with the traditional risk-based approach.
From Proposition 2, Et[Mt+1rS
t+1]=1. Following Cochrane (2001, p.19), I can rewrite this
equation as the beta-representation, Et[rS




amount of risk, and Mt 
Vart[Mt+1]
Et[Mt+1] is the price of risk. Now Proposition 2 also says that
Et[rS
t+1]=Et[rI
t+1] where the right-hand side only depends on characteristics from equation
(15). Further, Et[rI
t+1] = Et[rS
t+1] = rft+tMt, implies that t =
Et[rI
t+1] rft
Mt , which ties
covariances with characteristics. But apart from this mechanical link, risk only plays a
secondary role in the characteristic-based determination of expected returns.
3.2 Intuition in Two Canonical Examples
I construct two canonical examples to illustrate the basic intuition underlying the anomalies
explanations. Both examples have constant return to scale, =1. In the rst example, the
only costs of investment are linear purchase/sale costs, i.e., (It;Kt)=It. And in the second
example, there are also quadratic costs of physical adjustment, i.e.,







Kt where a > 0 (18)
183.2.1 Linear Purchase/Sale Costs
This example can explain the earnings-related anomalies. Intuitively, the marginal product
of capital (i.e., MPK) at time t+1 is in the numerator of investment return. But MPK is
closely related to protability, so expected return increases with expected protability.
Specically, when (It;Kt)=It, equation (15) implies that:
Et[rt+1] = Et[1(Kt+1;Xt+1)] + (1   ) (19)
i.e., expected net return is expected marginal product of capital minus depreciation rate.












i.e., expected return is expected protability!
The example is also consistent with the protability anomaly. Intuitively, protability is
highly persistent; therefore, high protability implies high expected protability, which in
turn implies high expected returns. The following assumption captures this persistence:
Assumption 4 The operating prot-to-capital ratio (or equivalently protability) follows:
t+1
Kt+1








where >0 and 0< <1 are the long-run average and the persistence of operating prot-
to-capital, respectively. And "
t+1 is a normal random variable with a zero mean.
Since the operating prot-to-capital ratio equals protability plus a constant depreciation
rate, Assumption 4 basically says that protability is persistent. Substituting t=Nt +Kt
19into equation (21) yields:
Nt+1
Kt+1








where the sum of the rst two terms denotes expected protability and "
t+1 denotes earnings
surprise. There is much evidence on the persistence of protability (e.g., Fama and French
(1995, 2000, 2004)). In fact, Fama and French (2004) report that the current protability is
the strongest predictor of protability one to three years ahead. It is important to note that
the specic, rst-order autoregressive form is unimportant, and more complex time series
specications will give basically the same economic insights.
Combining equations (20) and (21) yields:






i.e., expected return is an increasing, linear function of protability. Equation (23) also
implies a new testable hypothesis, i.e., the magnitude of the protability anomaly should
increase with the persistence of protability.
The same mechanism driving the expected-protability and protability anomalies is also
useful for understanding the post-earnings-announcement drift that has bewildered nancial
economists for more than three decades. Intuitively, earnings surprise and protability are
both scaled earnings, and should contain similar information on future protability.5 If
earnings surprise captures a principal component of expected protability as protability
does, then earnings surprise should correlate positively with expected returns.
5To be precise, earnings surprise is commonly measured as Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) (e.g.,
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)). The SUE for stock i in month t is dened as SUEit
eiq eiq 4
it ,
where eiq is quarterly earnings per share most recently announced as of month t for stock i, eiq 4 is earnings
per share four quarters ago, and it is the standard deviation of unexpected earnings, eiq eiq 4, over the
preceding eight quarters.
20Formally, lagging equation (22) by one period and plugging the resulting Nt
Kt into equation




t +1. The equation implies that
the expected return has a positive loading, , on the current-period earnings surprise, "
t .
A new testable hypothesis emerges, i.e., the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement
drift should increase with the persistence of protability.
Although useful for explaining the sign of the earnings-related anomalies, the simple
example with (It;Kt) = It has many limitations. First, the inverse relation between the
magnitude of the earnings-related anomalies and the market value cannot be explained.
From equations (20) and (23), the partial derivatives of expected return with respect
to expected protability and protability are both constant, independent of the market
value. Second, the example cannot explain the value anomaly because (It;Kt) = It




Kt + (1   )

Kt into equation (20) and dierentiating both sides yield
@Et[rt+1]
@(It=Kt) = Et[11(Kt+1;Xt+1)]Kt = 0, where the last equality follows from constant return
to scale. This says that expected return is independent of the investment rate, and hence
independent of the payout and equity-nancing rates.
3.2.2 Quadratic Adjustment Costs
I now show that all the limitations in the rst example can be extinguished by introducing
adjustment costs into the model. To illustrate the basic intuition, I use a parametric example
with quadratic adjustment costs. Then equations (15) and (18) imply that:
rt+1 =
1(Kt+1;Xt+1) + (a=2)(It+1=Kt+1)2 + (1   )[1 + a(It+1=Kt+1)]
1 + a(It=Kt)
(24)
This is in essence the same investment-return equation in Cochrane (1991, 1996).




Kt+1 + , taking




1+a(It=Kt) > 0.6 The inequality follows because
the denominator equals the marginal qt. Therefore, controlling for market-to-book (the
denominator of investment return), expected return increases with expected protability.






Pt , which is inversely related with the market value, Pt. This explains why the
magnitude of the expected-protability anomaly is stronger in small rms.








@Et[Nt+1=Kt+1]. It then follows from the argument for the
expected-protability anomaly that
@Et[rt+1]
@(Nt=Kt) is positive and decreasing in the market value.
The Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift The argument for the protability anomaly
is useful for explaining the post-earnings-announcement drift because earnings surprise and
protability contain similar information on future protability. The prediction that
@Et[rt+1]
@(Nt=Kt)
decreases with the market value is particularly intriguing because the magnitude of the post-
earnings-announcement drift is inversely related to the market value (e.g., Bernard (1993)).
I am not aware of other rational explanations of the earnings-related anomalies. Two
papers oer explanations for a related anomaly, price momentum that buying recent winners
and selling recent losers yield positive abnormal returns (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).
6This partial derivative corresponds to the case of xing
It+1
Kt+1. This is only for the ease of exposition.
Allowing
It+1
Kt+1 to vary does not aect the qualitative result. The reason is that, intuitively, more protable
rms invest more, i.e.,
@(It+1=Kt+1)
@Et[Nt+1=Kt+1] > 0, consistent with the evidence in Fama and French (1995). As
a result, the numerator of
@Et[rt+1]


















22In Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), the composition and systematic risk of the rm's assets are
persistent, leading to positive autocorrelations of expected returns. In Johnson (2002), recent
winners have temporarily higher expected growth than recent losers. Assuming that stocks
with higher expected growth earn higher average returns, Johnson shows that his model can
generate price momentum. I complement his work by showing that his key assumption arises
naturally from the rst principles of optimal investment.
The Investment Anomaly Intuitively, the Q-theory is a theory of investment demand.
The downward-sloping investment-demand function then implies a negative relation between
investment rate and cost of capital (i.e., expected return). Intuitively, investment rate
increases with net present value of capital (e.g., Brealey and Myers (2003, Chapter 2)).
But the net present value is inversely related to cost of capital, controlling for expected
future cash ows. Higher cost of capital implies lower expected net present value, which in
turn implies lower investment rate, and vice versa.
I now formally establish the negative slope of the investment-demand function, as in
Figure 1. Let U
q
t+1 denote the numerator of the investment return in equation (24), and
U
q













@(It=Kt) . To show
@Et[rt+1]
















Kt + (1   )









From Figure 1, the investment-demand function is also convex. To see this, dierentiating
@Et[rt+1]
@(It=Kt) once more with respect to It
Kt yields
@2Et[rt+1]



































t+1 >0. Later I use this convexity to understand other evidence.
The investment anomaly is stronger in rms with high operating income-to-asset ratios
(e.g., Titman, Wei, and Xie (2003)). This pattern can be captured in the model. Using
equation (21) to express
t+1
Kt+1 in terms of t
Kt and dierentiating  
@Et[rt+1]














Besides Cochrane (1991, 1996), most models cited in footnote 1 can explain the
investment anomaly. I contribute by unifying their diverse explanations with the investment-
return equation, by using it to explain other anomalies, and by illustrating the interaction
between the return-investment relation and operating income-to-capital.
The Value Anomaly The downward-sloping and convex investment-demand function
manifests itself as many anomalies other than the investment anomaly. The value anomaly





a >0. This says that growth rms invest more and grow faster
than value rms, a result consistent with the evidence in Fama and French (1995). The






@Qt <0, i.e., growth
rms earn lower average returns than value rms.












@Pt . To show that the left-hand side is
negative, it suces to show
@(It=Kt)
@Pt >0 because the investment-demand function is convex.
But from 1+a It
Kt = qt = Qt = Pt
Kt+1, Pt =
h




Kt + (1   )
i
Kt. Dierentiating both
sides with respect to It
Kt yields @Pt




@(It=Kt) >0 both imply that growth rms invest more and grow faster. @Pt
@(It=Kt) >0 does
not contradict the evidence that small rms invest more and grow faster than big rms (e.g., Evans (1987)
24Several recent studies have proposed rational explanations for the value anomaly using
investment-based models. Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) construct a real options model in
which endogenous changes in assets in place and in growth options impart predictability in
returns. Also using real options models, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004a) emphasize
the role of operating leverage, and Cooper (2005) emphasize the role of xed costs in driving
the value anomaly. Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) use a dynamic general equilibrium
production economy, Kogan (2004) uses a two-sector general equilibrium model, and Zhang
(2005) uses a neoclassical investment model to link expected returns to rm characteristics.
My model is most related to Zhang (2005). By making Assumptions 1{3, I now obtain
some analytical results. The scope of anomalies addressed is also much wider. Zhang oers
an explicitly solved model in which Assumption 3 is violated. And his simulation results
are consistent with my analytical results. This consistency implies that, even when stock
and investment returns are not exactly equal without Assumption 3, they share similar
time-series and cross-sectional properties.
More recently, Gourio (2004) analyzes a putty-clay investment model. He argues
that imperfect capital-labor substitutability can induce more than one percent increase in
operating prots given a one percent increase in sales. And this eect is more important
for value rms because they have low productivity. Finally, like my work, Chen (2004) also
explains the inverse relation between the value anomaly and the market value. Chen argues
that the inverse relation arises from shorter life expectancy of small rms. This mechanism is
dierent from mine that arises from convex adjustment cost and applies to long-lived rms.
and Hall (1987)). The evidence is documented with the logarithm of employment as the measure of rm
size. This measure corresponds to log(Kt) in the model. The model is consistent with the evidence because
Pt=
h




Kt + (1   )
i
Kt implies that Kt=Pt
h




Kt + (1   )
i 1
, which in turn implies
that @Kt
@(It=Kt) <0.
25The Payout Anomaly The payout anomaly can also be explained using the investment-
demand function. Intuitively, rms' cash-ow constraint says that the sources and the uses














1 + a It
Kt

=  qt < 0.
Thus, controlling for protability, optimal payout and investment rates are negatively
correlated. Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) document that dividend-increasing
rms signicantly reduce their capital expenditures over the next three years, while the
dividend-decreasing rms begin to increase their capital expenditure. By the chain rule,
the negative slope of the investment-demand function then manifests itself as the positive






@(Ct=Kt) > 0). And the convexity of










I am not aware of other rational explanations for the payout anomaly.
The SEO-Underperformance Anomaly This anomaly can also be explained using the
investment-demand function. Intuitively, rms' cash-ow constraint says that the sources
and the uses of funds must be equal. With quadratic adjustment costs, when outside equity









Kt. As a result,
@(Ot=Kt)
@(It=Kt) = qt > 0. Thus,
controlling for protability, optimal equity-nancing and investment rates are positively
correlated. By the chain rule, the negative slope of the investment-demand function






@(Ot=Kt) <0). And the convexity of the investment-demand function manifests itself


























Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Richardson and Sloan (2003) provide some evidence
supportive of the Q-explanation of the SEO anomaly. Loughran and Ritter shows that
issuing rms have much higher investment rates than nonissuing rms for nine years around
the issuing date. And issuing rms are disproportionately high-growth rms. Richardson
and Sloan nd that the negative relation between external nance and expected returns
varies systematically with the use of the proceeds. When the proceeds are invested in net
operating assets as opposed to being stored as cash, the negative relation is stronger. In
contrast, the negative relation is much weaker when the proceeds are used for renancing or
retained as cash. This evidence suggests an important role of capital investment in driving
the SEO anomaly. And this is exactly my theoretical approach.
The model shows that the stronger value anomaly in small rms and the stronger SEO
anomaly in small rms are basically the same phenomenon driven by the convex expected
return-investment relation. This prediction is consistent with the evidence that the SEO
underperformance shrinks greatly once both size and book-to-market are controlled for (e.g.,
Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000)).
Several recent studies have proposed rational explanations of the SEO anomaly. Eckbo,
Masulis, and Norli (2000) argue that issuing rms are less risky because their leverage ratios
are lowered. There is no leverage in my model, and the economic mechanism works through
optimal investment. Schultz (2003) argues that using event studies is likely to nd negative
abnormal performance ex post, even if there is no abnormal performance ex ante.9 The
9Schultz (2003) uses his argument to explain the underperformance of initial public oerings (IPOs). The
same logic applies to SEOs. If early in a sample period, SEOs underperform, there will be few SEOs in
the future because investors are less interested in them. The average performance will be weighted more
towards the early SEOs that underperformed. If early SEOs outperform, there will be many more SEOs in
27calendar-time evidence is immune to this problem. But the Q-explanation applies to event-
time and calendar-time underperformance.
Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004b) argue that that prior to issuance, the rm has
both assets in place and an option to expand; this composition is a levered, risky position.
If the exercise of the option is nanced by equity issuance, then risk must drop afterwards.
The real options explanation and the Q-explanation are consistent because they both work
through optimal investment. But I do not assume growth options to be riskier than assets in
place, although it is likely to be true in good times when the option to expand is important.
3.3 The General Model
I now extend the results in the previous two examples into the general Q-theoretical
framework. This is an important step because the general setup allows much more exible
econometric specications than the quadratic adjustment-cost function. Except for a few
technical details, the basic intuition remains unchanged in the general setup.
Proposition 3 (The Expected-Protability Anomaly) Under Assumptions 1 and 3,
expected returns correlate positively with expected protability,
@Et[rt+1]
@Et[Nt+1=Kt+1] > 0, and the
magnitude of the correlation decreases with the market value,
@2Et[rt+1]
@Et[Nt+1=Kt+1]@Pt <0.
Proposition 4 (The Protability Anomaly) Under Assumptions 1{4, expected returns
correlate positively with current-period protability, and the magnitude of this correlation





the future. The early performance will be weighted less in the average performance. Weighting each period
equally as in calendar-time regressions solves this problem.
28Proposition 5 (The Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift) Under Assumptions 1{4,
expected returns correlate positively with current-period earnings surprise, and the magnitude







Proposition 6 (The Investment Anomaly) Under Assumptions 1{3, expected returns
decrease with investment rate:
@Et[rt+1]
@(It=Kt) <0. If Assumption 4 also holds, the magnitude of the










Cochrane (1991, 1996) uses models with quadratic adjustment costs to derive the negative
relation between expected return and investment rate. He also shows that the relation
between expected return and expected investment rate and the relation between expected
return and expected investment growth are both positive. I extend his argument into the
general Q-framework, and use it as a foundation to explain other anomalies.
To derive the positive relations of expected returns with expected investment rate and




















>0. The inequality follows because 1  0,
Kt+2
Kt+1 >0, and G00>0. Given that expected return decreases with It
Kt but increases with
It+1
Kt+1,
it should also increase with
It+1
Kt+1= It
Kt. But as a ratio of two stock variables, Kt
Kt+1 is likely
to be dominated by the ratio of two ow variables,
It+1
It . Therefore, expected return should
increase with expected investment growth.
In the general model, the investment rate is an increasing function of marginal q.







t = qt or It
Kt = G0 1(qtK
1 
t ), where G0 1() is the
inverse function of G0(). And since G00>0, both G0() and G0 1() are increasing functions.
Because marginal q is proportional to market-to-book, the negative slope of the investment-
demand function implies the negative relation between expected return and market-to-book.
29To explain why the value anomaly is stronger in small rms, I need:
Assumption 5 The augmented adjustment-cost function (It;Kt) satises:
111(It;Kt)  0; 112(It;Kt)  0; and 222(It;Kt)  0
It is easy to verify that standard specications such as the quadratic adjustment-cost function
and the proportional and quadratic nancing-cost functions satisfy this assumption.
Proposition 7 (The Value Anomaly) Under Assumptions 1{3, expected returns
correlate negatively with market-to-book,
@Et[rt+1]
@Qt < 0. If Assumption 5 also holds, the





Some new testable hypotheses are collected below.
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1{3 and 5: (i) the relation between expected return
and market-to-book is convex,
@2Et[rt+1]
@Q2



























also holds, then (iv) the
investment-demand function is convex, i.e.,
@2Et[rt+1]
@(It=Kt)2 >0.
Proposition 8 says that the convexity in the investment-demand function holds in the

















. Although compatible with quadratic
adjustment costs, this condition is more strict than the other assumptions.










payout Ct > 0. Controlling for protability, optimal payout and investment rates are
again negatively correlated. This negative correlation, coupled with the downward-sloping
investment-demand function, implies a positive expected return-payout relation. And by the
30chain rule, the convexity of the relation between expected return and market-to-book gives
rise to the stronger payout anomaly in value rms.
Proposition 9 (The Payout Anomaly) Denote payout or free cash ow as:
Ct  C(Kt;Kt+1;Xt) = ((Kt;Xt)   (It;Kt))1f(Kt;Xt) (It;Kt)>0g (25)
where 1fg is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the event described in fg is




@(Ct=Kt) 0, where the inequality is strict when Ct is strictly positive. If
Assumption 5 also holds, the payout anomaly is stronger in value rms than that in growth
rms,
@2Et[rt+1]
@(Ct=Kt)@Qt 0, where the inequality is strict when Ct>0.









Kt when outside equity Ot > 0.
Controlling for protability, optimal nancing and investment rates are positively correlated.
This correlation, coupled with the downward-sloping investment-demand function, implies a
negative expected return-nancing relation. By the chain rule, the convex relation between
expected return and market-to-book implies the stronger SEO anomaly in small rms.
Proposition 10 (The SEO Anomaly) Denote the outside equity, Ot, as:
Ot  O(Kt;Kt+1;Xt) = ((It;Kt)   (Kt;Xt))1f(It;Kt) (Kt;Xt)>0g (26)




@(Ot=Kt) 0, where the inequality is strict when Ot is strictly positive.





  =@Pt0, where the inequality is strict when Ot>0.
314 Empirical Implications
This section discusses empirical implications of the theoretical results. Section 4.1 proposes
the Q-representation of expected returns as a new empirical asset pricing model. Sections 4.2,
4.3, and 4.4 compare the Q-framework with the standard beta- and SDF-framework as well
as the Ohlson (1995) valuation model popular in accounting research, respectively. I argue
that, although internally consistent with the existing frameworks in theory, the Q-framework
is likely to have comparative advantages in practice.
4.1 A New Empirical Asset Pricing Model
By Proposition 2, if the operating-prot and the augmented adjustment-cost functions have
the same degree of homogeneity, stock return equals investment return. Ex ante, this implies
that expected stock returns equal expected investment returns.













where Zt is a vector of instrumental variables known at time t, such as anomaly-related
variables. rS
t+1 is the stock returns of portfolios sorted by the anomaly-related variables. 
can be properly parameterized, as in the investment literature (e.g., Hubbard (1998) and
Erickson and Whited (2000)). With the estimated parameters, expected stock returns can
be constructed from economic fundamentals through the expected investment returns.10
Other aspects of the real economy, such as nancial constraints and labor adjustment
costs, can be incorporated into the investment-return equation. And empire-building type
10Cochrane (1991) implicitly tests the moment condition (27) by comparing the properties of stock and
investment returns, both at the aggregate level.
32of agency cost can be introduced by assuming managers derive private benets proportional
to the operating prot (e.g., Stulz (1990)). At the portfolio level, convex costs of adjustment
are perhaps enough because investment at this disaggregated level is smooth. At the rm
level, where lumpy investment is common (e.g., Doms and Dunne (1998)), non-convex costs
can be introduced, such as the wedge between purchase and sale prices of capital and xed
costs proportional to capital.
4.2 The Q-Framework versus the Beta-Framework
The beta-framework is very popular in empirical nance. In event studies, cumulative
abnormal returns are computed as the dierence between realized returns and expected
returns from, for example, the CAPM. Tests are performed to see if cumulative abnormal
returns are on average zero (e.g., Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll
(1969)). In cross-sectional tests, stock returns are regressed on beta and rm characteristics
(e.g., Fama and French (1992)). In time-series tests, mimicking portfolios are formed based
on characteristics of interest. Their average returns are tested to see if they equal zero, and
zero-intercept tests are performed by regressing the portfolio returns on a set of benchmark
factor returns (e.g., Fama and French (1993)).
The null hypotheses in these tests are derived from the CAPM and its various extensions,
either static or conditional, single-factor or multi-factor models. Similar to the CAPM,
all these extensions say that only covariances should explain expected returns. Anomalies
emerge because characteristics often dominate covariances in explaining returns. That only
covariances matter is the basic point of Daniel and Titman (1997), and is taken as \one
general feature of the rational approach" in Barberis and Thaler (2003, p.1091).
Not necessarily. My results show that characteristics can aect expected returns, often
33in the directions reported in the anomalies literature. But my model is entirely rational.
Therefore, the empirical debate on covariances versus characteristics is not a well-dened
question. And rejecting the CAPM and its close cousins is not equivalent to rejecting ecient
markets (e.g., Fama (1965)) or rational expectations (e.g., Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972)).
Further, the Q-representation is perhaps more useful in practice than the beta-
representation. The reason is that the right-hand side of the Q-representation contains
only rm characteristics. And measuring characteristics basically amounts to loading and
cleaning data from Compustat, much easier than measuring covariances.
Measuring covariances is dicult. First, consumption-based asset pricing has not settled
on the right form of the SDF, with which returns are supposed to covary. Second, all dynamic
models imply that covariances are time-varying. But despite recent theoretical eorts, no
easy-to-implement econometric specications have been derived. And estimates of time-
varying covariances in practice often use convenient, but ad hoc specications yielding results
sensitive to alternative methods. Finally, even if we assume the priced common factors are
known and covariances are constant, estimates of expected returns from beta-pricing models
are extremely imprecise even at the industry level (e.g., Fama and French (1997)).
The diculty of measuring covariances is illustrated vividly in Berk, Green, and Naik
(1999) and Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003). In these models, covariances are sucient
statistics of expected returns. And true covariances indeed dominate characteristics in cross-
sectional regressions in their simulations. But when estimated covariances are used, they are
dominated by characteristics. Unfortunately, true covariances are unobservable in practice.
In sum, it is perhaps time to explore alternative empirical models of expected returns,
for example, along the lines of the Q-representation, without having to estimate covariances.
344.3 The Q-Framework versus the SDF-Framework
The Q-framework complements the SDF-framework that is the workhorse of consumption-
based asset pricing (e.g., Cochrane (2001) and Campbell (2003)).
Tests under the SDF-framework are usually done by using Et[Mt+1rS
t+1]=1 as moment
conditions in GMM, where Mt+1 is the SDF that can be parameterized using aggregate
consumption (e.g., Hansen and Singleton (1982)). This framework has had some success
in understanding anomalies (e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Lustig and Nieuwerburgh
(2004), Parker and Julliard (2004), and Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2004)).
But the SDF-framework still leaves plenty of room open. Most important, anomalies are
empirical relations between expected returns and rm characteristics. But characteristics
do not enter the moment conditions directly. They are buried in rS
t+1, i.e., portfolio returns
sorted on characteristics. Further, even if the moment conditions survive over-identication
tests, it is not clear what economic mechanisms drive the results. For example, the empirical
success of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2004) relies on the
returns of value stocks covarying more with the price of risk in bad times than the returns of
growth stocks. But why this occurs can perhaps be better understood by modeling expected
returns and rm characteristics together, for example, in the Q-theoretical framework.
For another example, the important contributions of Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad
(2004) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show that the value anomaly can be explained
because value stocks have higher cash-ow betas than growth stocks. But the underlying
economic mechanism is unknown because rm dynamics are not modeled.
Characteristics do enter the SDF framework directly in Cochrane (1996), Gomes, Yaron,
and Zhang (2004), and Whited and Wu (2004). In Cochrane and Gomes et al., the SDF is
35a linear function of aggregate investment return constructed using aggregate fundamentals.
But rm characteristics are absent. White and Wu test Et[Mt+1rI
t+1] = 1 where Mt+1 is
a linear combination of the Fama-French (1993) factors. Firm characteristics show up in
constructing rm-level investment returns, rI
t+1. But stock returns are now absent.
In all, by linking expected returns directly to characteristics in a rigorous, yet easy-to-
implement framework, the Q-theory can cover the grounds missing from the SDF framework.
In terms of the big picture, Fama (1991, p. 1610) calls for a coherent story that \(1) relates
the cross-section properties of expected returns to the variation of expected returns through
time, and (2) relates the behavior of expected returns to the real economy in a rather detailed
way". Consumption-based asset pricing is naturally t for the rst goal, but production-
based asset pricing is perhaps better equipped to achieve the second. And the coherent story
envisioned by Fama can be provided by the conceptual framework of general equilibrium.
4.4 The Q-framework versus the Ohlson Framework
The Q-framework is also related to Ohlson's (1995) residual income valuation model that is
extremely popular in capital markets research in accounting (e.g., Frankel and Lee (1998),
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999), and Kothari (2001)).





j=1 E[Yt+j   rBt+j 1]=(1 + r)j
Bt
(28)
where Bt is book equity at time t, Yt+j is earnings at t+j, Yt+j rBt+j 1 is the residual
income, dened as the dierence between earnings and the opportunity cost of capital, and r
is the discount rate for the expected residual income or the long-term expected stock return.
36The model has several predictions.11 First, controlling for expected residual earnings and
expected book equity relative to current book equity, a higher book-to-market equity implies
a higher expected return. Second, given book-to-market, rms with higher expected residual
income relative to current book equity have higher expected returns. Third, controlling
for book-to-market and the expected growth in book equity or investment growth, more
protable rms or rms with higher expected earnings relative to current book equity have
higher expected returns. Finally, given book-to-market and expected protability, rms with
higher expected growth in book equity have lower expected returns.
These predictions are largely consistent with the predictions of the Q-model, implying
that the Q-model is potentially useful in guiding empirical capital markets research.
But there is one notable dierence. The Ohlson model says that high expected investment
growth leads to low expected returns, but the Q-model says otherwise. Liu, Warner, and
Zhang (2003) nd that rms with higher expected investment growth earn higher average
returns than rms with lower expected investment growth, but the average-return dierence
is only marginally signicant. Further tests can sort out these two competing hypotheses.
Several recent papers use valuation models to estimate expected returns (e.g., Claus and
Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)). They nd that the estimated
equity premium is only about 2{3%, much lower than the historical average. Kothari (2001)
argues that their long-term growth forecasts, especially the terminal perpetuity growth rates,
seem too low. In contrast, estimating expected returns from the Q-model only requires inputs
of the one-period-ahead protability and investment rate, which should be easier to forecast
than their long-term counterparts.
11The discussion on the predictions from the Ohlson model follows that of Fama and French (2004).
37More important, valuation models are accounting models. In contrast, based on the rst
principles, the Q-theory can provide a microeconomic foundation that links expected returns
to the real economy in a rather detailed way.
5 Conclusion
A voluminous literature on capital markets anomalies in nancial economics has mounted
an enormous challenge to ecient markets with rational expectations. These anomalies are
empirical relations of future stock returns with rm characteristics, corporate policies, and
events, relations not predicted by current rational asset pricing theories.
Using a neoclassical model, I demonstrate analytically that, much like aggregate expected
returns that vary with business cycles (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), expected
returns in the cross-section vary with rm characteristics, corporate policies, and events.
Accordingly, the model is qualitatively consistent with many anomalies often interpreted
as over- and under-reaction in inecient markets. These anomalies include the relations
of future stock returns with market-to-book, investment and disinvestment rates, seasoned
equity oerings, tender oers and stock repurchases, dividend omissions and initiations,
expected protability, protability, and more important, earnings announcement. The model
also implies a new empirical asset pricing model that avoids the dicult task of estimating
covariances and long-term growth rates.
The basic point of this paper is reminiscent in spirit of the point made by Kydland and
Prescott (1982). The Kydland-Prescott paper says that the neoclassical framework is a good
start to build an equilibrium theory of business cycles. Monetary misperceptions and sticky
prices from Keynesian economics may be important, but their eects can be better quantied
38and hence understood using the neoclassical benchmark. Similarly, this paper says that the
neoclassical framework is a good start to build an equilibrium theory of the cross-section
of returns. Over- and under-reaction from behavioral nance may be important, but their
eects can be better quantied and hence understood using the neoclassical benchmark.
From this perspective, I view my theoretical work as complementary to behavioral
theories of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam
(1998), and Hong and Stein (1999). In explaining anomalies, these models assume constant
expected returns and focus on systematic variations in abnormal returns. By constructing
an economic foundation for time-varying expected returns in the cross section, I provide a
rational benchmark against which the importance of investor sentiment can be gauged.
The equilibrium analysis of the cross section of returns has only started. Much more work
remains to be done. The Q-theory can be extended to model IPO, mergers and acquisitions,
spinos, debt-nancing, and other corporate decisions. We can then evaluate whether the
theory is consistent with long-term stock price drift associated with these events. Numerically
solved models are also valuable for producing richer economic insights (for example, cyclical
variation of equity nancing) than those available analytically. To obtain quantitative
predictions, computational experiments can be implemented in the style of Kydland and
Prescott (1982). Finally, several authors have used the real options framework to explain
anomalies (e.g., Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004a,
2004b)). It is interesting to work out the interrelations between the Q-based and the real
options-based explanations. To this end, a framework similar to that of Abel, Dixit, Eberly,
and Pindyck (1996) can be useful.
More important, the Q-representation of expected returns can be implemented empiri-
39cally to see to what extent the economic mechanisms identied in this paper can explain
the anomalies quantitatively. More direct tests are also available. We can measure earnings
momentum after controlling for the pricing eects of expected protability or protability.
Further, the Q-theory implies that the investment, value, payout, and SEO anomalies are
basically the same phenomenon driven by optimal investment. It is interesting to measure
how much payout and SEO anomalies subsist after controlling for capital investment.
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46A Anomalies
This appendix briey reviews the empirical literature on the anomalies that are the targets
of my theoretical explanations in this paper.
1. The Investment Anomaly Disinvesting rms earn higher average returns (e.g., Miles
and Rosenfeld (1983), Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993)), but investing rm earn lower
average returns in the future (e.g., Richardson and Sloan (2003), Titman, Wei, and Xie
(2003), Anderson and Garcia-Feij oo (2004), and Xing (2004)). Titman et al. also shows that
the anomaly is stronger for rms with higher operating income-to-asset ratios. Cusatis et al.
attribute their evidence to market underreaction. Richardson and Sloan and Titman et al.
interpret their evidence as investors underreacting to empire-building implications of capital
investment. Anderson and Garcia-Feij oo interpret their evidence as consistent with the real
options models of Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003). Xing
interprets her evidence using an optimal investment model similar to that in Zhang (2004).
2. The Value Anomaly Value stocks earn higher average returns than growth stocks
(e.g., Graham and Dodd (1934), Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985), Fama and French
(1992), and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)). Fama and French (1993) also
document that the value anomaly is stronger in small rms than in big rms where rm
size is measured as the ex-dividend market value.
3. The Payout Anomaly Anomalous long-term positive abnormal returns apply to
rms paying cash-ow out to shareholders, and are often interpreted as underreaction.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) nd positive long-term abnormal returns when rms
tender for their stocks. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) nd that the average
abnormal four-year return after the announcements of open market share repurchases is
signicantly positive. And the average abnormal return is much higher for value rms, but
is negative although insignicant for growth rms. Finally, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack
(1995) nd that stock prices underreact to the negative information in dividend omissions
and the positive information in initiations.
4. The SEO-Underperformance Anomaly Anomalous long-term negative abnormal
returns apply to rms raising capital from external markets, and are often interpreted as
overreaction. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1995) document
that rms conducting seasoned equity oerings (SEO) earn much lower returns over the
47next three to ve years than nonissuing rms with similar characteristics. Brav, Geczy,
and Gompers (2000) and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) nd that the underperformance
is more pronounced for small rms. A frequent conclusion in this literature is that rms
time their external nancing decisions to exploit the mispricing of their securities in capital
markets because of investor overreaction (e.g., Ritter (2003)).
5. The Expected-Protability Anomaly Stock prices \underreact" to new information
about future cash ow. Shocks to expected cash ows are positively correlated with shocks
to expected returns (e.g., Frankel and Lee (1998), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999), Cohen,
Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002), Vuolteenaho (2002), and Fama and French (2004)).
Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) nd similar evidence at the aggregate level. Cohen et al.
and Vuolteenaho also nd that the magnitude of this correlation is higher in small rms.
6. The Protability Anomaly Given market price relative to cash ows or book
equity, more protable rms earn higher average returns (e.g., Haugen and Baker (1996)
and Piotroski (2000)). Piotroski also shows that this relation is stronger in small rms.
7. The Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Ball and Brown (1968) and Bernard and
Thomas (1989, 1990) document that stock price drifts in the direction of earnings surprise,
dened as the scaled change in earnings. Bernard (1993) shows that the magnitude of the
drift is inversely related to the market value. And Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)
nd similar evidence using time series and cross-sectional regressions. This anomaly is often
interpreted as underreaction to earnings news.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 By the Principle of Optimality (e.g., Theorem 9.2 of Stokey, Lucas,
and Prescott (1989)), the rm's value function (6) can be rewritten recursively as:
V (Kt;Xt) = max
Kt+1
(Kt;Xt)   	(Kt;Kt+1) + Et[Mt+1V (Kt+1;Xt+1)] (B1)
where
	(Kt;Kt+1)  (Kt+1   (1   )Kt;Kt) (B2)
The envelope condition is:
V1(Kt;Xt) = 1(Kt;Xt)   	1(Kt;Kt+1) (B3)
48and the rst-order condition is:
 	2(Kt;Kt+1) + Et[Mt+1V1(Kt+1;Xt+1)] = 0 (B4)
Next, from equation (B2),



























t Kt+1 = 	(Kt;Kt+1) (B5)
Now plugging equation (B3) into equation (B4) yields the stochastic Euler equation:
 	2(Kt;Kt+1) + Et[Mt+1 (1(Kt+1;Xt+1)   	1(Kt+1;Kt+2))] = 0 (B6)
Expanding the value function (B1) recursively and using equations (2) and (B5) to obtain:
V (Kt;Xt) = 1(Kt;Xt)Kt   	1(Kt;Kt+1)Kt   	2(Kt;Kt+1)Kt+1
+ Et [Mt+1 [1(Kt+1;Xt+1)Kt+1   	1(Kt+1;Kt+2)Kt+1   	2(Kt+1;Kt+2)Kt+2
+ Et+1[Mt+1;t+2V (Kt+2;Xt+2)]]] =  = 1(Kt;Xt)Kt   	1(Kt;Kt+1)Kt = V1(Kt;Xt)Kt
where the third equality follows from recursive substitution and from equation (B6). The
last equality follows from the envelope condition (B3).
Proof of Lemma 2 Solving equation (9) forward yields
qt = Et [Mt+1(1(Kt+1;Xt+1)   2(It+1;Kt+1))] + Et [Mt+1(1   )qt+1]
= Et [Mt+1(1(Kt+1;Xt+1)   2(It+1;Kt+1))] +
Et [Mt+1(1   )Et+1 [Mt+2(1(Kt+2;Xt+2)   2(It+2;Kt+2) + (1   )qt+2)]]













where the last two equalities follow from recursive substitution.
Proof of Proposition 1 From Proposition 1, V1(Kt;Xt)Kt=V (Kt;Xt). Both sides can
be rewritten as: 1(Kt;Xt)Kt 2(It;Kt)Kt+qt(1 )Kt = Pt+(Kt;Xt) (It;Kt).
49Simplifying using homogeneity of (Kt;Xt) and (It;Kt) yields qt(1   )Kt = Pt  
1(It;Kt)It. Equation (12) now follows because qt=1(It;Kt) from equation (8).
Proof of Lemma 3 The rst inequality is shown in the text. Now from Lemma 1 and










= (1   )Et[Mt+1V11(Kt+1;Xt+1)] (B7)













b Qt  0 (B8)
This says that the value function is weakly concave in capital. Now plugging equation (B8)
into (B7) yields: 12(It;Kt) = (1   )(   1) 1
Kt+1Et[Mt+1b Qt+1] = (1   )(   1)
qt
Kt+1  0.











Proof of Proposition 2 First express stock return in equation (16) in terms of cum-
dividend rm value as rS
t+1 =
V (Kt+1;Xt+1)
V (Kt;Xt) (Kt;Xt)+	(Kt;Kt+1). The recursive value function (B1)
evaluated at the optimum then yields Et[Mt+1rS
t+1]=1.






















V1(Kt;Xt)Kt   1(Kt;Xt)Kt + 	(Kt;Kt+1)
=
V (Kt+1;Xt+1)




where the rst equality follows from equation (B9), the second follows from equation (B5),
the third equality follows from the envelope condition (B3), and the fourth equality follows
from Lemma 1 and equation (2).
50Lemma 4 Dene the numerator of investment return:
Ut+1  1(Kt+1;Xt+1)   2(It+1;Kt+1) + (1   )1(It+1;Kt+1) (B10)
Under Assumptions 1{3, Ut+1>0, and the (gross) returns are positive, rt+1=
Ut+1
1(It;Kt) >0.
Proof. 1>0 and 20 follow from Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively. And 1=qt>0
follows from Lemma 3.












































































which is positive and decreasing in the market value, Pt.










Proof of Proposition 5 Proposition 5 also follows directly from the proof of Proposition









































where the rst term in equation (B12) is less than zero because Assumption 3 implies
G00()>0. It then suces to show that
@Et[Ut+1]




























+ (1   )1
















Dierentiating both sides with respect to (It=Kt) yields:
@Et[Ut+1]
@(It=Kt)
= Et[11(Kt+1;Xt+1)Kt + 2(1   )12(It+1;Kt+1)Kt   22(It+1;Kt+1)Kt
  (1   )
211(It+1;Kt+1)Kt] < 0 (B14)
where the inequality follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 and Lemma 3. Finally, plugging







   
@Et[rt+1]
@(It=Kt)

























By Lemma 4, to show
@Et[rt+1]
@Qt < 0, it suces to show that
@Et[Ut+1]
@Qt < 0. But
It=Kt = G0 1(qtK
1 
t ), from equation (8). Writing qt further as Qt, plugging It=Kt





t )), where G0 1() is the inverse function of G0. Now by the chain









Et[11(Kt+1;Xt+1) + 2(1   )12(It+1;Kt+1)
  22(It+1;Kt+1)   (1   )
211(It+1;Kt+1)] < 0 (B17)
where the inequality follows because 110;120, 220, and 11>0.


















































For notational convenience, denote the term in the conditional expectation in equation




t ) + (1   )

Kt and




t ) + (1   )

Kt into equation (B17) and dierentiating





















t 0, it suces to show that
@Et[Wt+1]
@Qt 0 because the rst term in equation
(B19) is nonnegative (Lemma 3 and Assumption 5 imply that Wt+1<0 and G000()0 because





G00(It=Kt)Et[111(Kt+1;Xt+1)   3(1   )2112(It+1;Kt+1)+3(1  
)122(It+1;Kt+1)   222(It+1;Kt+1) + (1   )3111(It+1;Kt+1)]  0, where the inequality
follows from Assumption 5 and Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 8
@2Et[rt+1]
@Q2
t > 0 follows from equation (B18). Equation (8) and
Proposition 1 imply that Qt=G0(It=Kt)K
 1



















































@Qt < 0 and equations (B20) and (B21), to show the second























































































second term is positive because
@Et[Ut+1]




























Proof of Proposition 9 First, when t t  0 or Ct = 0, the two derivatives in the
proposition are exactly zero. Now consider the case when Ct > 0; so I can ignore the






























where G 1() is the inverse function of G, and is also an increasing function because G is
around the neighborhood of optimal investment rate.










G0(It=Kt) > 0, where the
inequality follows because Proposition 6 says that
@Et[rt+1]


























@(Ct=Kt) < 0, where the inequality follows from the inequality (B18) and
equation (B20).
Proof of Proposition 10 When Ot=0, the two derivatives in the proposition are exactly
































































@(Ot=Kt)@Pt. To show the left-hand-side is negative, it suces
to show that
@2Qt
@(Ot=Kt)@Pt < 0 because
@2Et[rt+1]






@(Ot=Kt) > 0, and
@Et[rt+1]






@(Ot=Kt) < 0, where the
inequality follows from equation (B21) and
@(It=Kt)
@(Ot=Kt) >0.
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